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In this talk I explore the interrelation between the Oviedo Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine and the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
starting point of the analysis is to highlight the difference between the two treaties 
regarding their enforceability. An attempt is then made to identify which of the 
rights safeguarded in the European Convention of Human Rights involve issues raised 
in the Oviedo Convention. Admittedly, the most commonly referred to provision in 
the case-law of the Strasbourg Court is Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (right to respect for private and family life), under the ambit of which 
the issues of consent, private life and right to information as well as the human 
genome are dealt with. In addition, the talk addresses other issues within the scope 
of the Oviedo Convention, which have been raised under Articles 2, 3, 5 and 10 in 
the Strasbourg case-law. In the final analysis, one is tempted to consider whether the 
outcome of such an interrelation between the two Conventions is satisfactory. 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
I will approach the topic in a dialectical manner by asking questions and 
proposing answers. I must point out that I am of course speaking personally and not 
on behalf of the European Court of Human Rights (which I will refer to as the 
“Court”), of which I am a Judge.  
The title of my topic implies that at least to some extent the Oviedo 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 4 April 1997, including of course its 
four additional Protocols, is somehow interrelated with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (to be referred to as the “European Convention”). 
Let me first give some figures regarding the number of ratifications. The 
Oviedo Convention has been ratified by 29 out of the 47 member States of the 
Council of Europe (which are all States parties to the European Convention). Its 
Additional Protocol on Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (Paris, 12/1/1998) has 
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been ratified by 24 member States, its Additional Protocol on Transplantation of 
Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (Strasbourg, 24/01/2002) by 15 member States, 
its Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research (Strasbourg, 25/01/2005) by 11 
member States, and lastly its Additional Protocol on Genetic Testing for Heath 
Purposes (Strasbourg 27/11/2008) by 6 member States. 
 
What makes the two Conventions interrelated? 
This is, of course, the first question to be asked in examining the topic and 
the following reasons can be given in reply: 
1. Both Conventions are Council of Europe Conventions based on the same European 
values, such as democracy, the rule of law and equality. 
2. In addition, both are part of international law and should not be interpreted in a 
vacuum but be considered as part of a wider legal system. They must be read one 
with the other in a harmonious and coherent way. Such an interpretation would be 
in accordance with the case-law of the Court and Article 31 § 3(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (to be referred to as the “Vienna Convention”), 
which provides that, together with the context of a treaty, any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into 
account.  
3. The Court, which is the Council of Europe organ responsible for interpreting and 
applying the European Convention provisions (see Article 32 thereof) is also 
responsible for giving advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Oviedo Convention (see Article 29 of that Convention). This 
confirms the strong link between the two instruments.  
4. The Oviedo Convention provisions, though dealing with what we may consider as 
third (or fourth) generation human rights (after civil and political rights and freedoms 
and social and economic rights), protecting human rights in the biomedical sector, 
may elucidate different aspects of certain European Convention rights in fields in 
which science has made some progress and where human dignity has a central focus. 
In paragraph 9 of the Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention, the strong 
relationship between the two Conventions is clarified as follows:                 
“The two Conventions share not only the same underlying approach but also 
many ethical principles and legal concepts. Indeed, [the Oviedo Convention] 
elaborates some of the principles enshrined in [the European Convention+.” 
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5. A possible evolution or expansion of European Convention rights through the 
provisions of the Oviedo Convention can quite naturally be accomplished; in many 
cases the Court has interpreted the European Convention as being a living 
instrument and has given a practical and effective interpretation to its provisions. 
The wider the European consensus on a topic, the more it helps European 
Convention norms to evolve and address social changes. 
6. The widening of European Convention rights can also be rendered easier since, as 
stated in its Preamble and repeated in the Preamble to the Oviedo Convention and 
in the Preambles to three of the four additional Protocols to the Oviedo Convention 
(all of them except the one on the prohibition of cloning), “the aim of the Council of 
Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and ... one of the 
methods by which the aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.  
7. The Oviedo Convention may strengthen the safeguards of European Convention 
rights in the fields of medicine and biology, in view of the new risks deriving from the 
progress of science and the possible misuse of scientific development. 
8. Human dignity brings the two Conventions closer. The Oviedo Convention is 
expressly grounded on human dignity. Though there is no express reference to 
human dignity except in the preamble to Protocol 13 to the European Convention 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, nevertheless, 
human dignity is inherent in every European Convention right. The Grand Chamber 
in Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, 11/7/02, and many 
other cases, has held that respect for human dignity and human freedom is the very 
essence of the European Convention (see paragraph 90). Human dignity is used by 
the Court as a means of interpreting its provisions. Thus the notion of human dignity 
could be used to blend harmoniously the corresponding rights in the two 
Conventions. Article 2 of the Oviedo Convention, which provides that “the interest 
and welfare of the human beings shall prevail over the sole interest of society or 
science” offers an extremely important interpretative rule which the Court may also 
use where there is a doubt as to whether a restriction on a right should be applied or 
not. 
9. In view of the above, it can rightly be argued that, though independent, one 
convention may complement the other to a certain extent.  
 
Do the two Conventions differ regarding their enforceability? 
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The answer must be in the affirmative.  
Unlike the European Convention, where the Court has jurisdiction to 
interpret and apply the Convention provisions (see Article 32) and the Committee of 
Ministers is responsible for supervising the execution of the judgments of the Court 
(see Article 46 of the European Convention), the Oviedo Convention does not 
provide for a judicial body to sanction the violation of its provisions. Under the 
Oviedo Convention, the Court only gives advisory opinions without direct reference 
to any specific proceedings in the Court and the request must not come from an 
individual but from the Government of a Party, after having informed the other 
Parties or the Steering Committee on Bioethics. As stated in paragraph 165 of the 
Explanatory Report to the Oviedo Convention,  
“This Convention does not give individuals a right to bring proceedings before 
the European Court of Human Rights. However, facts which are an 
infringement of the rights contained in this Convention may be considered in 
proceedings under the European Convention of Human Rights, if they also 
constitute a violation of one of the rights contained in the latter Convention.”   
It should be clarified that under Article 32 of the European Convention, the 
Court does not have jurisdiction to apply any instrument other than the European 
Convention, so it cannot apply the provisions of the Oviedo Convention, with the 
consequence that no issue of execution of judgments or supervision thereof by the 
Committee of Ministers arises. In this connection, it should be emphasised that 
under Article 35 of the Vienna Convention the imposition on States of duties that 
they have not expressly and voluntarily accepted is prohibited. It is somewhat 
paradoxical, however, that the Court is able to interpret the provisions of the Oviedo 
Convention but not to apply and implement them. 
Despite that, the provisions of the Oviedo Convention can be enforced by the 
domestic legislation of each Party, and in this connection Article 1 of the Oviedo 
Convention provides the following: 
“Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect 
to the provisions of this Convention”.  
So long as this is done by the legislation of a Party, its courts will be primarily 
responsible for ensuring compliance with the Oviedo Convention.  
 
Which European Convention rights can most often involve Oviedo Convention 
issues?  
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Undoubtedly, Article 8 of the European Convention, dealing with the right to 
respect for private and family life, is the Article which will most often involve such 
sensitive issues. Next may come Articles 2, 3, 5, 10 and 14 of the European 
Convention, dealing respectively with the right to life, right to be free from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, right to liberty, freedom of expression and 
prohibition of discrimination. An extensive Research Report entitled “Bioethics and 
the case-law of the Court”, has been prepared by the Court and its 2016 edition is 
available on its website. The Report includes examples of cases classified by topic in 
which bioethical issues have been raised. It also includes examples of cases where 
the Oviedo Convention has been cited. There are many cases which need to be 
discussed but given the time constraints, I will try to be quite selective and brief. 
 
Which Oviedo Convention issues have been raised under Article 8 of the European 
Convention in the case-law of the Court?  
 
(i) Consent 
The first issue raised under Article 8 is the consent issue, which in the Oviedo 
Convention is dealt with in Chapter II, Articles 5-9. Under Article 5 § 1 of the Oviedo 
Convention “*a+n intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the 
person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.” Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Oviedo Convention make provision for protection of persons not able to consent and 
persons who have a mental disorder, respectively.  
In Glass v. the United Kingdom, no. 61827/00, 6/3/04, the Court held that an 
unauthorised medical treatment of the applicants’ severely mentally and 
psychologically disabled son without court authorisation violated Article 8 of the 
European Convention. The relevant Oviedo Convention provisions are quoted in the 
section dealing with the related international material. At paragraph 75 of its 
judgment the Court very importantly remarked: 
“It [the Court] would add that it does not consider that the regulatory 
framework in place in the United Kingdom is in any way inconsistent with the 
standards laid down in the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine in the area of consent …; nor does it accept the view that the 
many sources from which the rules, regulations and standards are derived only 
contribute to unpredictability and an excess of discretion in this area at the 
level of application.” 
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In Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC] no. 6339/05, 10 April 2007, the Grand 
Chamber held that the impossibility for the applicant to have IVF treatment due to 
the withdrawal of her ex-partner’s consent to implant the embryos created jointly by 
them had not amounted to a violation of Article 8 or of Articles 2 and 14 of the 
European Convention. In this case, as in the previous case, the Oviedo Convention 
provisions are quoted in the section dealing with the relevant international material. 
The Court, taking into account the lack of any European consensus on the issue, held 
that the respondent State had not transgressed its margin of appreciation in deciding 
that the applicant’s right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the 
genetic sense should not be accorded greater weight than her former partner’s right 
to respect for his decision not to have a genetically related child with her. The Court 
also said that it did not consider that the regulatory framework in place in the United 
Kingdom was in any way inconsistent with the standards laid down in the Oviedo 
Convention in the area of consent. 
In Juhnke v. Turkey, no. 52515/99, 13/5/08, the Court held that the 
gynaecological examination which had been imposed on the applicant during police 
custody without her free and informed consent had not been shown to have been 
“in accordance with the law” or to have been “necessary in a democratic society”, as 
is provided in Article 8 § 2 of the European Convention, so there had accordingly 
been a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the European Convention. 
Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention is quoted in the section dealing with the relevant 
international material but no further mention or discussion is made, as is the 
common practice of the Court. 
In M.A.K. and R.K. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 45901/05 and 40146/06, 
23/3/10, the Court held that the medical examination of a nine-year old girl without 
her parent’s consent had violated Article 8 of the European Convention. The relevant 
Oviedo Convention provisions are quoted in the section dealing with the 
international material. The Court said that (see paragraph 77) “*w+here the patient is 
a minor, the person with appropriate authorisation is the person with parental 
responsibility” and it added by referring to Glass that: “This fully accords with the 
Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine”. This remark is 
important for our study of the interrelation between the two Conventions. 
In V. C. v. Slovakia, no. 18968/07, 8/11/11, the Court held that the 
sterilisation of a Roma woman during the delivery of her second child without her 
informed consent had violated Article 8 of the European Convention. The relevant 
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Oviedo Convention provisions are quoted in the section dealing with the 
international material and more specifically the Council of Europe documents. In 
assessing the facts, the Court held that the applicant’s sterilisation should be 
considered in the light of the requirement to respect a person’s dignity and integrity 
embodied in Article 1 of the Oviedo Convention, ratified by Slovakia. Again, one can 
see how the Oviedo Convention was employed in interpreting Article 8 of the 
European Convention in the light of the above-mentioned requirement. 
 
(ii) Private life and right to information 
The second issue raised under Article 8 is private life and the right to 
information which in the Oviedo Convention is dealt with in Chapter III under Article 
10, of which paragraph 1 reads “*e+veryone has the right to respect for private life in 
relation to information about his or her health”.  
In Parrillo v. Italy [GC], no. 46470/11, 27/08/15, the Grand Chamber held 
that preventing a woman from donating embryos to scientific research after her 
partner’s death did not violate Article 8 of the European Convention. The application 
was based also on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention but the 
Court declared it incompatible ratione materiae, given that human embryos cannot 
be reduced to “possessions” within the meaning of that provision. The Court quoted 
Articles 2 and 18 of the Oviedo Convention. Article 18 §§ 1 and 2 respectively 
provide that “where the law allows research on embryos in vitro it shall ensure 
adequate protection of the embryo” and that “the creation of embryos for research 
purposes is prohibited”. That was the first time the Court had had to decide whether 
the notion of “private” life included the right to make use of embryos obtained from 
IVF treatment by donating them to scientific research. The “family life” aspect of 
Article 8 was not at issue here, since the applicant did not want to start a family and 
have the embryos in question implanted. The Court referred also in its judgment to 
Article 27 of the Oviedo Convention, which provides that none of its provisions 
should be interpreted as limiting the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure 
of protection with regard to the application of biology and medicine. In concluding, 
the Court held that the respondent State had not overstepped the wide margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by it in the present case and that the ban in question was 
“necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the 
Convention, linked to the aim of protecting morals and the rights and freedoms of 
others. This case is a good example where the right to private life was extended to 
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include the ability to exercise a conscious and considered choice regarding the fate 
of the embryos in question and also where the second paragraph of Article 8 of the 
European Convention, dealing with restrictions, was applied. Article 26 § 1 of the 
Oviedo Convention also provides for restrictions on the exercise of rights and is 
drafted on the model of Article 8 § 2 of the European Convention but though it 
makes reference to the “rights and freedoms of others” it does not refer also to 
“morals” as a legitimate aim for a restriction of a right.  
In another Grand Chamber case, namely S.H. and Others v. Austria, [GC] no. 
57813/00, 3/11/11, the Court held that the prohibition by Austrian law of 
heterologous artificial procreation techniques for in vitro fertilisation had not 
violated Article 8 of the European Convention. The Court said in particular that its 
task was not to substitute itself for the competent national authorities in 
determining the most appropriate policy for regulating matters of artificial 
procreation. It concluded that neither in respect of the prohibition of ovum donation 
for the purposes of artificial procreation nor in respect of the prohibition of sperm 
donation for in vitro fertilisation had the Austrian legislature exceeded the margin of 
appreciation afforded to it. The only reference made by the Court to the Oviedo 
Convention was just to say that that Convention did not deal with the question of 
donation of gametes, but prohibited the use of medically assisted reproduction 
techniques to choose the sex of a child (Article 14 is quoted). It is important to 
mention one of the concluding remarks of the Court: 
“The Court also notes that the Austrian Constitutional Court, when finding 
that the legislature had complied with the principle of proportionality under 
Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, added that the principle adopted by the 
legislature to permit homologous methods of artificial procreation as a rule 
and insemination using donor sperm as an exception reflected the then 
current state of medical science and the consensus in society. This, however, 
did not mean that these criteria would not be subject to developments which 
the legislature would have to take into account in the future.” (paragraph 
117). 
 
In a number of cases concerning subject matter that falls within the Oviedo 
Convention the Court has, however, refrained from referring to it at all. 
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In I. v. Finland, no. 20511/03, 17/7/08, the Court held that the domestic 
authorities’ failure to protect, at the relevant time, the applicant’s health records 
against unauthorised access violated Article 8 of the European Convention. In this 
case no mention was made of the Oviedo Convention. At the material time the 
Oviedo Convention had been signed but not ratified by Finland. 
In Armonienè v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, 25/11/08 and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 
no. 23373/03, 25/11/2008, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 
of the European Convention concerning the low ceiling imposed on damages 
awarded to the applicants on account of a serious breach of their privacy by a 
national newspaper which made public their health data. Again, in this case no 
mention was made of the Oviedo Convention and unfortunately this was not done 
despite the fact that the Oviedo Convention had been ratified by Lithuania and was 
in force there at the material time. 
In Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, [GC] no. 25358/12, 24/01/17, the Grand 
Chamber by eleven votes to six, held that the permanent removal from the 
custody of the applicants of a child who was born abroad through surrogacy  in 
violation of the national law and which turned out to be genetically related to 
neither of them, did not violate Article 8 of the European Convention. The 
Court held that the “the public interests at stake weigh heavily in the balance, 
while comparatively less weight is to be attached to the applicants’ interest in their 
personal development by continuing their relationship with the child” (paragraph 
215). The Court did not refer to the Oviedo Convention probably because this 
Convention does not deal with surrogacy motherhood and also because Italy had not 
ratified it. However, the Court quoted principle 15 on “Surrogate Motherhood” of 
the Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical 
Sciences which considers agreements for surrogate motherhood, unenforceable 
prohibiting doctors from using techniques leading to such a method of artificial 
procreation. 
In Dickson v. the United Kingdom, [GC], no 44362, 4/12/07, which concerned 
the refusal to provide the applicants – a prisoner and his wife – with facilities for 
artificial insemination, the Court found that Article 8 was applicable in that the 
refusal of artificial insemination facilities at issue concerned their private and family 
lives which notions incorporate the right to respect for their decision to become 
genetic parents. In particular the Court found that “the absence of such an 
assessment as regards a matter of significant importance for the applicants must be 
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seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation so that a fair balance 
was not struck between the competing public and private interests involved. There 
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 8 of the [European] Convention” (see 
paragraph 85). Though no reference was made at all to the Oviedo Convention, the 
case is important because it shows that the margin of appreciation of the 
respondent State cannot be exercise so lightly in a such an important issue of 
bioethics.  
In Marper v. the United Kingdom, [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
4/12/08, the Grand Chamber held that the retention of fingerprints of DNA samples 
for longer than was necessary to achieve the detection of a criminal offence, was 
contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention. No mention was made of the 
Oviedo Convention. It is to be noted that United Kingdom and Ireland have not 
ratified or even signed the Oviedo Convention. 
In Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, no. 23890/02, 20/12/07, the Court held that even 
having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the State, the application of a 
rigid and inflexible time-limit for the exercise of paternity proceedings, regardless of 
the circumstances of an individual case and, in particular, the knowledge of the facts 
concerning paternity, impairs the very essence of the right to respect for one's 
private life under Article 8 of the European Convention. Again no reference was 
made to the Oviedo Convention. 
(iii) Human genome 
A third issue raised under Article 8 regarding the human genome comes 
under Chapter IV of the Oviedo Convention and especially its Article 12, dealing with 
predictive genetic tests which may be performed for health purposes.  
In Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10, 28/8/12, the Court held that the 
blanket ban by the Italian authorities on preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 
while at the same time allowing the subsequent abortion of the foetus that was 
affected by a genetic disease, was disproportionate and violated Article 8 of the 
European Convention. In this case the Court, when dealing with the relevant 
European law, referred not only to Article 12 of the Oviedo Convention but also to 
paragraph 83 of the Explanatory Report thereto. In its judgment (see paragraph 55) 
the Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 is 
a broad concept which includes, among other things, the right of self-determination 
and the right to respect for the decision to become or not to become a parent. It also 
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held (see paragraph 56) that Article 8 protected the right to respect for the decision 
to become genetic parents and applied to heterologous insemination techniques for 
in vitro fertilisation. What is more relevant for the case, the Court decided (see 
paragraph 57) that the applicants’ desire to conceive a child unaffected by the 
genetic disease of which they were healthy carriers and to use assisted reproduction 
technology (ART) and PGD to this end “attracts the protection of Article 8, as this 
choice is a form of expression of their private and family life”. This judgment is one 
of the clear examples where the Court widens the scope of Article 8 of the European 
Convention under the influence of the Oviedo Convention despite the fact that it 
said (see paragraph 23) that the latter Convention had not been ratified by the 
Italian Government. 
 
Which Oviedo Convention issues have been raised under Article 2 of the European 
Convention in the case-law of the Court?  
In Vo v. France, no. 53924/00, 8/7/04, an involuntary abortion had resulted 
from medical negligence. Criminal proceedings for two possible offences were 
brought against the doctor. However, they were unsuccessful, because one offence 
did not apply to the 20-21-week-old foetus and an amnesty applied to the other. The 
applicant complained of the authorities’ refusal to classify the taking of her unborn 
child’s life as unintentional homicide. She argued that the absence of criminal 
legislation to prevent and punish such an act breached Article 2 of the European 
Convention. 
The Court in its judgment referred to all relevant provisions of the Oviedo 
Convention and its Additional Protocols under the title “European Law”, including 
Articles 1, 2 and 18 of the Oviedo Convention dealing with the purpose of that 
Convention, the primacy of the human being and the research on embryos in vitro, 
respectively. 
The Court observed (see paragraph 84) that “at European level”, “there is no 
consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus …. although they 
are beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the 
potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted 
procreation or embryo experimentation.” It also remarked that the Oviedo 
Convention and its Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research were careful not to 
give a definition of the term “everyone”, and that the explanatory report indicated 
that, in the absence of unanimous agreement on the definition, the member States 
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had decided to allow domestic law to provide clarification for the purposes of the 
application of that Convention. The Court also said that it was worth noting that it 
might be requested under Article 29 of the Oviedo Convention to give advisory 
opinions on the interpretation of that instrument. However, such a possibility has 
unfortunately never been used. 
The Court in Vo, after recapitulating the relevant case-law, held that the 
unborn child was not regarded as a “person” directly protected by Article 2 of the 
European Convention and that if the unborn did have a “right” to “life”, it was 
implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests. The Strasbourg institutions 
have not, however, as was also held, ruled out the possibility that in certain 
circumstances safeguards may be extended to the unborn child.  
Finally, the Court held that in the circumstances of the case, an action for 
damages in the administrative courts could be regarded as an effective remedy that 
was available to the applicant. Such an action, which she failed to use, would have 
enabled her to prove the medical negligence she alleged and to obtain full redress 
for the damage resulting from the doctor’s negligence, and there was therefore no 
need to institute criminal proceedings in that case. Even assuming that Article 2 was 
applicable, as the Court concluded, there had been no violation of Article 2 of the 
European Convention. 
It can be said that the Court in Vo used the Oviedo Convention as a tool in 
evaluating whether there was a consensus among the members States of the Council 
of Europe on a question it had to examine under Article 2 of the European 
Convention. 
In A., B. and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, 16/12/10, the Grand Chamber 
held that restrictions on obtaining an abortion violated Article 8 in respect of only 
the third applicant, who had a rare form of cancer. There was no mention of the 
Oviedo Convention probably because it does not contain provisions on abortion but 
the case is interesting in terms of bioethics generally. Since there was no European 
scientific or legal definition of the beginning of life, the Grand Chamber held that a 
broad margin of appreciation on legal protection was in principle accorded to the 
member States to determine whether or not a fair balance was struck between the 
protection of the public interest in the right to life of the unborn, on the one hand, 
and the conflicting rights of the parents to respect for private life under Article 8 on 
the other hand. The Court also held as follows on the role of European consensus in 
the development and evolution of the European Convention protections: 
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 “234. However, the question remains whether this wide margin of 
appreciation is narrowed by the existence of a relevant consensus. 
The existence of a consensus has long played a role in the development and 
evolution of Convention protections beginning with Tyrer v. the United 
Kingdom (25 April 1978, § 31, Series A no. 26), the Convention being considered a 
“living instrument” to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. 
Consensus has therefore been invoked to justify a dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention (see Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 41, Series A no. 31; Dudgeon, 
cited above, § 60; Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 102, Series A no. 
161; L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and39829/98, § 50, ECHR 2003-I; 
and Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 85).” 
In my opinion, the beginning of life should not be left to the States’ margin of 
appreciation. It is clear from the provisions of the European Convention that it deals 
with persons, i.e. already born human beings, and the exceptions to the right to life 
in Article 2 § 2 do not therefore include abortion. If the members of the Council of 
Europe wish to protect unborn life, apart from using their national legislation, they 
should enact a relevant Protocol to the European Convention dealing with the rights 
of the unborn. Article 4 § 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights makes it 
clear that the protection of the right to life starts from the moment of conception. 
But that was not the intention of the drafters of the European Convention.  
In Lambert and Others v. France, [GC] no. 4605/05, 24/6/14, the Grand 
Chamber held by twelve votes to five that the withdrawal of Vincent Lambert’s 
artificial nutrition and hydration would not be in breach of the State’s obligations 
under Article 2 of the European Convention. In the judgment under the heading 
“Council of Europe Material” reference is made inter alia to Articles 1, 5, 6 and 9 of 
the Oviedo Convention and to the Oviedo Guide on the decision-making process 
regarding medical treatment in end-of-life situations. As is clear from the judgment 
(paragraph 62) this Guide does not deal with issues of euthanasia or assisted suicide, 
which some national legislations authorise. 
At paragraph 148 of the judgment the Court held the following: 
“148. Accordingly, the Court considers that in this sphere concerning the end 
of life, as in that concerning the beginning of life, States must be afforded a 
margin of appreciation, not just as to whether or not to permit the 
withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining treatment and the detailed 
arrangements governing such withdrawal, but also as regards the means of 
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striking a balance between the protection of patients’ right to life and the 
protection of their right to respect for their private life and their personal 
autonomy… However, this margin of appreciation is not unlimited … and the 
Court reserves the power to review whether or not the State has complied 
with its obligations under Article 2.” 
As it went on to say (see paragraph 180), the Court took the view that the 
Conseil d’État was entitled to consider that the testimony submitted to it was 
sufficiently precise to establish what Vincent Lambert’s wishes had been with regard 
to the withdrawal or continuation of his treatment. It concluded that the domestic 
authorities had complied with their positive obligations flowing from Article 2 of the 
European Convention, in view of the margin of appreciation left to them in the 
present case. 
The minority based their opinion on Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2346/02, 
29/4/02, where it was held that Articles 2 and 3 were “one-way-avenues” and they 
included only positive and not negative rights. According to the Pretty judgment, 
“Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the 
diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-
determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose 
death rather than life” (paragraph 39). As the minority said, Vincent Lambert was 
being fed, and food and water are two basic life-sustaining necessities which are 
intimately linked to human dignity. 
In my opinion, with due respect to the majority, the minority’s view was the 
correct one. Human life is sacred and must be considered as an absolute value and 
must not be dependent on the margin of appreciation of each State. The right to life 
under Article 2 should not be interpreted in the light of Article 8 or any other 
provision, since consent and personal autonomy cannot create a right which does 
not exist, i.e. the right to die. Human dignity should be based on the idea of sanctity 
of life and should protect a person from every kind of attack even if it is coming from 
the person himself or herself. The judgment of the majority unfortunately adopted a 
new hierarchy between the right to life and human dignity, because it considered 
human dignity more important than life itself, without which, the exercise of any 
other right is not possible. 
It is not clear how much influence the Oviedo Convention had on the 
judgment in Lambert. The judgment is based on the notion of consent but Vincent 
Lambert had not left clear instructions in advance and in any event, neither the 
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Oviedo Convention nor its Guide expressly or impliedly provide that a person’s 
consent may enable the doctors to proceed with euthanasia or assisted suicide. On 
the contrary, the opposite is stated in the Guide and in the Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Recommendation 1418(1999), also referred to in the judgment in Lambert (see 
paragraph 70): “a terminally ill or dying person’s wish to die never constitutes any 
legal claim to die at the hands of another person or a legal justification to carry out 
an action intended to bring about death”. Though this Recommendation is cited in 
the judgment, the above important provision is omitted. The Court should not have 
based such an issue, which is not covered by the exceptions to the right to life under 
Article 2 § 2 of the European Convention, on the margin of appreciation of a State.  
Lastly reference should be made to Cyprus v. Turkey, [GC] no, 25781/94, 10 
May 2001. In this case the Grand Chamber held by sixteen votes to one that no 
violation of Article 2 of the Convention had been established by reason of an alleged 
practice of the Turkish authorities of denying access to medical services to enclaved 
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus. Judge Marcus-Helmond, ad 
hoc judge in respect of Cyprus, in his partly dissenting opinion refers to the rapid 
evolution of biomedical techniques and new threats and dangers to human dignity, 
some of which the Oviedo Convention seeks to cover. What he said in his opinion is 
worthy of quotation: 
“My view is that, at a time when freedom of movement is regarded as 
essential, especially when it comes to obtaining optimal medical care, a denial of 
such freedom by the State amounts to a serious breach of its obligations towards 
those within its jurisdiction. I consider that is something which may amount to a 
violation of the State's undertaking under Article 2 of the Convention to protect 
everyone's right to life by law. 
We are living in a period of rapid scientific evolution and there may be 
substantial differences between institutions offering medical treatment, whether 
from one country to another or within the same country. For a State to use force 
to prevent a person from attending the institution which he considers offers him 
the best chance of recovery is to my mind highly reprehensible. 
Furthermore, I regret that the European Court of Human Rights did not seize 
this opportunity to give Article 2 a teleological interpretation as it has done in the 
past with other Articles ... 
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With the rapid evolution of biomedical techniques, new threats to human 
dignity may arise. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, signed at 
Oviedo in 1997, seeks to cover some of those dangers. However, to date only a 
limited number of States have signed it. Moreover, this Convention only affords 
the European Court of Human Rights consultative jurisdiction. In order this 
“fourth generation of human rights” to be taken into account so that human 
dignity is protected against possible abuse by scientific progress, the Court could 
issue a reminder that under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights the States undertook to protect everyone's right to life by law. 
The right to life may of course be interpreted in many different ways, but it 
undoubtedly includes freedom to seek to enjoy the best physically available 
medical treatment.” 
 
Has any Oviedo Convention issue been raised under Article 3 and Article 5 of the 
European Convention in the case-law of the Court?  
In Bataliny v. Russia, no. 10060/07, 23/07/17, the Court held that testing a 
new drug without the consent of a patient who was held in a psychiatric hospital for 
two weeks had violated Articles 3 and 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4 of the European Convention. 
The Court found that it was (paragraph 90) “unacceptable in the light of 
international standards … that a program of scientific research with new drugs be 
implemented without the consent of the subject submitted to the experimentation”. 
When mentioning the “international standards”, the Court made a reference also to 
the paragraph (paragraph 55) in which it states the relevant provisions of the Oviedo 
Convention, including Articles 15, 16 and 17. These provisions come under Chapter V 
of the Oviedo Convention entitled “scientific research”. Under the provisions of 
these Articles, scientific research in the field of biology and medicine must ensure 
the protection of the human being (Article 15) and can be undertaken only if the 
strict conditions of Articles 16 or 17 are met, depending respectively whether the 
person is or is not able to consent to research. 
 
Has any Oviedo Convention issue been raised under Article 10 of the Convention in 
the case-law of the Court?  
In Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, 13/7/12, 
the Grand Chamber found that the national authorities did not overstep the broad 
margin of appreciation afforded to them to ban the poster campaign of the applicant 
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association, which promoted human cloning, and the reasons given to justify their 
decisions were “relevant and sufficient” and met a “pressing social need” and 
therefore it held that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention. Reference was made under the heading “international law” to the 
Oviedo Convention and its Protocol on Cloning without specific reference to any 
provision or any discussion of them in the Court’s reasoning. 
 
In view of the above analysis, can the result of the interrelation between the two 
Conventions be considered satisfactory? 
Though I started the speech by explaining how much potential this 
interrelation should have, I cannot conclude that its outcome has been as 
satisfactory as could be expected. My concluding thoughts are the following: 
1. 20 years after its signature, the Oviedo Convention has not yet been ratified by 
18 Member States of the Council of Europe and its Protocols by even more 
States.  
2. The Court has not to date been requested to give an advisory opinion on a legal 
question concerning the interpretation of the Oviedo Convention, as provided for 
under Article 29 of that Convention. If the Court were asked to give an advisory 
opinion on the Oviedo Convention, it would be more willing to refer back to that 
opinion when applying a Convention provision which relates to the relevant 
provision of the Oviedo Convention. As I have already mentioned, the Court in Vo 
urged that the possibility of seeking an advisory opinion under Article 29 should 
be used. 
3. With the exception of a few judgments of the Court, in all the rest, the relevant 
provisions of the Oviedo Convention are either quoted in the introductory law 
part and not discussed or even referred to later on, or they are not referred at 
all. Without an explanation in the judgment on the connection or relevance of 
the reference to an Oviedo Convention provision in the introductory part of the 
judgment, it would not be safe to anticipate what influence such a mere 
reference may in fact have had on the outcome of the case.  
4. But in the few exceptions, some of which have been Grand Chamber cases, 
where the Court has gone deeper into the interrelation between the two 
Conventions, its achievement in bringing the two Conventions closer to each 
other and to further advancing human rights has been significant. This has been 
done in the following ways: 
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(i) By using the standards laid down by the Oviedo Convention as a basis to test a 
national regulatory framework, as was the case, for example, in Glass, Evans, 
M.A.K. and R.K. In effect, this test of consistency with the Oviedo standards 
amounts to equalising these standards with the Convention standards. 
(ii) By using the Oviedo Convention as a basis to test an interference with a 
human right as in the V.C. and Bataliny cases. 
(iii) By using the Oviedo Convention as a tool to evaluate whether there is a 
European consensus on the relevant issue, as for example in the Evans and Vo 
cases (where the Court found that there was no European consensus), or 
whether a State overstepped or transgressed its margin of appreciation, as in the 
Evans case, and apparently in the Parillo case. 
(iv) By using Oviedo Convention provisions to widen the scope of a European 
Convention provision, as for example in the Costa and Pavan and Parillo cases. 
5. The Court in its case-law seems to allow issues of unborn life, assisted suicide and 
euthanasia to fall within the margin of appreciation of member States. It is not 
clear whether the Court has been influenced, and if so, to what extent, by the 
Oviedo Convention. With due respect, however, I believe that these issues 
should not have been left within the margin of appreciation of the member 
States.  
In my view, it is clear that Article 2 of the European Convention does not 
cover unborn life. By contrast, as has been said above, Article 4 § 1 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights makes it clear that the protection of the right of life 
starts from the moment of conception. But that was not the intention of the drafters 
of the European Convention. However, since unborn life needs to be protected by 
the Convention, I propose that a new Protocol to the European Convention be 
adopted to deal with this matter. If, as I suggest, unborn life does not come under 
Article 2 of the Convention, then no issue should arise before the Court except to the 
extent that the matter may relate to the life of the mother. If on the other hand, 
unborn life comes under Article 2, then again the matter should not be left within 
the margin of appreciation of member States, since the exceptions to the right to life 
under Article 2 § 2 of the European Convention do not apply to unborn life.  
Regarding now the other crucial issue, that of the end of life, there is, in my 
view, only a right to life and not a right to die, and, since assisted suicide and 
euthanasia are prohibited by Article 2 of the European Convention and are not 
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covered by the exceptions to the right to life, the matter cannot be left within the 
margin of appreciation of the States.  
Conclusion 
The nature and purpose of the two Conventions and the common values and 
principles of the Council of Europe underlying them require that a compatible 
interpretation between their provisions be made. The principle of effectiveness, 
which is inherent in the two Conventions and is based on their purpose, assist in 
making them both effective and closer to each other.  
A harmonious interpretation of the provisions of the two Conventions will be 
a shield against any threats of the progressing science. One must, of course, always 
be wary of any new dangers, but at the same time be positive, since new challenges 
of science and society test human rights and make them even stronger in their 
eternal journey towards fulfilling their purpose.  
 
